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Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or
Please Leave Some Room for Robin Hood
STEPHEN E. WEL*
This paper rests on two foundations. One is the conception of fair use that
federal Judge Pierre N. Levall has so eloquently articulated over recent years,
i.e., that fair use is not an exception to copyright's overall objective but, rather,
wholly consistent with that objective.2 If copyright's initial purpose was, as
Leval has argued, to be an incentive that would stimulate progress in the arts for
the intellectual enrichment of the public, then what is basically required in order
to determine whether any particular use is or is not a fair one is a two-pronged
inquiry. First, is the use consistent with copyright's underlying purpose of
stimulating further productive thought and public instruction?3 Second, if so does
it then do so without unduly dampening copyright's incentive for creativity?
The other foundation upon which this paper rests is the proposition that the
realms of the verbal and the visual are so fundamentally different that the rules
developed to govern fair use in the one realm-language-based rules developed
primarily in the context of the printed word-are not necessarily the most
productive rules by which to govern fair use in the other. What will be argued
here is that the objective of copyright could better be achieved if the visual arts
had a distinct and separate fair use regime of their own. In considering the
outlines of such a regime, regard must be given not only to the ways in which the
visual arts, taken as a whole, differ from their creative counterparts in other
realms and most especially from the domain of the printed word, but also to the
ways in which the various genres within the visual arts differ from one another.
Four such differences are considered below.
* Emeritus Senior Scholar in the Smithsonian Institution's Center for Education and
Museum Studies. From 1974 until his retirement in 1995, Mr. Weil served as Deputy Director
of the Smithsonian's Hirshom Museum and Sculpture Garden. Mr. Weil graduated from
Brown University in 1949 and from the Columbia University School of Law 1956.
1 Judge Leval was first appointed to the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in 1977 and subsequently elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
1993.
2 See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105
(1990).
3 Judge Leval refers to uses that meet this first test (i.e., uses that introduce additional
creative elements rather than simply duplicate the original copyrighted material) as
"transformative" uses. His views on fair use, which have proven highly influential, are set forth
in an extensive series of opinions, speeches, and law review articles.
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In contrast to its relatively infrequent use in literature, appropriation has
played and continues to play an important role in many of the most significant
visual art movements of the past century. On a recent visit to the Hirshom
Museum and Sculpture Garden,4 I was struck by how many objects that there
were on view in which one artist made reference to the work of another. In the
Museum's then-ongoing special exhibition, Regarding Beauty,5 the first six
works of art that a visitor encountered-works by artists as diverse as Jannis
Kounellis, Michelangelo Pistoletto, Yasumasa Morimura and Cindy Sheran-
all incorporated, in part or in whole, other works of art: casts of antique
sculpture, a series of portraits from the Renaissance, and, in one instance,
Manet's great painting Olympia in its entirety.
On another floor, Nam June Paik's Video Flag-its seventy thirteen-inch
monitors arranged in the familiar format of the American flag-was pulsing out a
barrage of micro-second-long snippets culled from television newscasts,
documentaries, commercials and films. Elsewhere were Larry Rivers's witty
reprises of Cezanne's Cardplayers and David's standing portrait of Napoleon
together with Gerhard Richter's sumptuous repainting of Titian's Annunciation
and Andy Warhol's own idiosyncratic version of the Mona Lisa. Outside the
museum, in shimmering stainless steel, stood Jeff Koons's six-foot-high
Kiepenkerl, a work cast directly from a twentieth-century replica of a nineteenth-
century bronze sculpture depicting a local tenant farmer that once stood in a
square in Munster, Germany.
This is more than coincidence. As the California-based experimental-music
and art collective Negativland has said:
Artists have always perceived the environment around them as both inspiration to act
and as raw material to mold and remold. However, this particular century has
presented us with a new kind of... human environment We are now all immersed in
an ever-growing media environment-an environment as real and just as affecting as
the natural one from which it sprang.6
4 The Hirshom Museum and Sculpture Garden is the Smithsonian Institution's museum
of modem and contemporary art. Located on the national Mall in Washington, D.C., between
Seventh and Ninth Streets, South West, it first opened to the public in October, 1974.
5 Regarding Beauty: A View of the Twentieth Century was a group exhibition organized
by the Hirshom Museum and Sculpture Garden and shown in Washington from October 7,
1999, through January 17, 2000. It was subsequently shown at the Haus der Kunst in Munich
from February 11 through April 30,2000.
6 NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE, available at http-//www.negativland.com/fairuse.html (last
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In tandem with the emergence of this "ever-growing media environment" has
been the emergence, not surprisingly, of a new legal environment as well. The
environment by which artists had once been surrounded was a freely usable one
of landscapes, seascapes, and townscapes, of cottages and cows. This new
environment-the one that artists today are seeking to mold and remold-
consists of an ever-greater measure of media and other human creations in which
intellectual property rights generally subsist. A contemporary artist who today
seeks to portray aspects of everyday life must, in the course of doing so, almost
inescapably bump up against somebody else's copyrighted material.
Beyond this change in subject matter, the repertory of techniques available to
contemporary artists has also expanded. One important early twentieth-century
development was the emergence of collage, a technique that frequently depends
upon the use of previously printed materials. A corollary technique-common to
virtually all of the photography-based arts-is montage, which again, may rely
heavily on pre-existing films, photographs, or video.7 Artists who would avoid
complications by limiting their appropriations to material in the public domain
find that the public domain itself has shrunk and continues to shrink. The
American artist Cindy Sherman, for example, is not yet fifty years old. If the
artists of some future generation should choose to build upon her art in the same
manner that she herself has chosen to build upon the work of still earlier artists, it
could well be another one hundred years or more before her work would be
safely in the public domain and those artists of the future were clearly at hlberty
to do so.
If our society is to continue to be enriched by the vigorous production and
distribution of original works of visual art, then visual artists need a license to
forage widely-far more widely than conventionally interpreted copyright law
might permit-in gathering the raw materials out of which to compose their
work. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,8 the United States Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that the rap group 2 Live Crew's 1989 version of Roy
Orbison's 1964 hit song "Oh, Pretty Woman" could be characterized as a parody
and that, accordingly-under a judicially crafted exception to the Copyright
Law-it did not constitute an infringement of the original. Although the 2 Live
Crew case might be read as a promising step in that direction, it should be read
with great caution. In the end, 2 Live Crew's in-your-face rap music proved so
outrageous that the Supreme Court could not escape its parodic element. 9
visited Feb. 10, 2001).
7 A montage is "the combining of pictorial elements from different sources in a single
composition." WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICIONARY 878 (1991).
8 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
9 Id at 578-85. Further details conceming this case, together with samples from the two
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That the deadpan and often elusive ironies of post-modernist visual art are
also parodies may not be quite so clear. Rogers v. Koons,10 a case in which the
court never really got what the artist intended, certainly seems a case in point.11
Even had the Koons case been decided otherwise, it would still have left visual
artists with a remarkably narrow fair use opening through which to wiggle.
Parody is by no means the only mode by which one work of art may refer to
another in order to achieve a desired artistic effect.
The American literary critic R.P. Blackmur once observed that poetry had
the capacity to add to our "stock of available reality."'12 Works of visual art share
that same capacity. When the copyright law is used-as it was in Koons-not
merely to award damages but actually to suppress a work of art, then its effect is
to diminish the stock of reality available to all of those who might one day have
come into contact with that work Or worse, as Louise Harmon has pointed out in
an article raising questions about the Koons decision, the loss to the public in
such an instance may go far beyond just that one particular work of art.13 "Other
artworks," she wrote, "may never reach maturation; some may never be
conceived. There is much to mourn in Jeff Koons's defeat. Little unseen deaths
inside you, inside me."14
In terms of the public's enrichment, the benefits to be expected from
permitting visual artists to work at their imaginative fullest would seem to
outweigh by far any resulting disincentives to creativity. Visual artists, above all,
need a fair use rule that is both flexible enough and spacious enough to permit
them a considerable degree of appropriation. To the extent that they might abuse
such a privilege, remedies less drastic than to deprive the public of their work
might better be established elsewhere than under the copyright law.
musical versions, can be found at THE COPYRIGHT WEBSITE, FINALLY, FAIR USE,
http//www.benedict.com/audio/crew/crew.htm (last visted Jan. 12,2001).
10 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
11 In Rogers v. Koons, the work of art at issue was a sculpture entitled String of Puppies
that the well-known New York artist Jeff Koons had based directly (and without authority) on
an image by the relatively lesser-known California photographer Art Rogers. Rogers sued for
copyright infringement. Koons's defense was that his sculpture was essentially satiric or
parodic in nature and, accordingly, was immune from any charge of infringement as a form of
fair use. In rejecting that claim and finding for Rogers, the court noted that parody can function
as such only when the work subject to parody was already familiar to the audience for the
parodic version and found that such was not the case in this instant situation. Id at 310.
12 JAMES D. BLOOM, THE STOCK OF AVAILABLE REALrIY: RtP. BLACKMUR AND JOHN
BERRYMAN (1984).
13 See Louise Harmon, Law, Art and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REV. 367,412 (1994).
14 Id.
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II.
For the visual arts to achieve their maximum vigor, not only do artists
require the freedom to work at their imaginative fullest but they also require the
support provided by an "artworld" of collectors, curators, critics and others. Such
an artworld cannot function properly, however, without the relatively unimpeded
circulation within it of images of contemporary art in such forms as slides,
transparencies, and printed illustrations. Of the several sensory dominions we
inhabit, that of the visual is arguably the most complex-both in the richness of
the elements by which it is composed and in the simultaneity with which those
elements may be apprehended. At any given moment, our visual field can
encompass hundreds or even thousands of these elements, each of a distinctive
color, contour, and texture. In terms of color alone, the appearance of any single
element may change from moment to moment depending upon the distance from
which it is seen, the light by which it is illuminated, and the proximity it has to
one or more other elements. If Eskimos truly do have thirty words for snow, that
number pales by comparison to the vocabulary that would be required-perhaps
a million words or more-to name all the distinct colors among which the human
eye can purportedly differentiate. The computer does even better. A 24-bit
monitor has the capacity to produce over sixteen million different colors.
Regard must be given here to those differences alluded to earlier between the
realms of the verbal and the visual. That words can be adequately defined by
other words is what makes a dictionary possible. By that same token, most verbal
compositions-a novel, a play, even a narrative poem---can be effectively
summarized or even paraphrased. A reviewer, for example, might write a
perfectly intelligible review of a new novel or play without ever actually quoting
a single line of text.
In general, though, images cannot be adequately defined at all, either by
words or by other images. Likewise, works of visual art-because they partake
of the simultaneity and infinite complexity of the visual realm-cannot be
adequately summarized or paraphrased. Neither can they be accurately described.
Imagine trying to provide an adequate verbal account of Botticelli's Primavera1 5
or Rembrandt's Night Watch.16 Unlike the situation of the literary critic, it would
be virtually impossible for an art reviewer to write an intelligible review of a new
painting without providingthe reader with some pictorial notion of what the
painting itself looked like. Not even quotations can help. Works of visual art,
unlike literary ones, are incapable of yielding up quotable extracts-some small
15 Sandro Botticelli (1445-1510), Primavera (c. 1477-78), Uffizi Gallery, Florence.
16 Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-69), The Militia Company of Captain Frans Banning Cocq
("Night Watch') (1642), Rijksmuseun, Amsterdam.
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detail that might give a better sense of the whole.
If works of contemporary visual art are to be discussed, analyzed, debated,
compared, championed, criticized, demonized, or otherwise to serve as the center
of any serious discourse, then images of those works-images of them in fall, not
just details-must be available to circulate among those who participate in that
discourse and who ultimately provide a support system for the creators of those
works.
Just as it might be sound copyright policy to provide contemporary visual
artists with greater latitude than other creative practitioners as to vhat they may
incorporate into their own work, it may also be sound policy to limit the ability of
such artists to use copyright to impede the free circulation of images of that work
within the cultural and commercial marketplaces. Also important is that artists
(or, as may be more frequently the case in actual practice, the surviving spouses
or other heirs of artists) not be able to use copyright in wholly arbitrary ways as a
means to stifle and/or control the views expressed by others with respect to their
work. To put too great an emphasis on the exclusionary aspects of copyright is to
undermine its fundamental public service objective.
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that, in determining whether
certain uses for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research might be "fair uses" and consequently non-infringing,
the factors to be considered in any particular case shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.17
Arguably, then, in determining the fairness or unfairness of producing and
distributing photographic and/or printed copies of a work of art for educational
purposes or for comment and criticism, little or no weight should be given to the
third of section 107's four fair use factors-the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.18 Because visual
images cannot be summarized, paraphrased, described, or even quoted from, it
follows that uses intended for the purposes of education, criticism, and comment
must-if they are to engender the meaningful discourse essential to ongoing
well-being of the visual arts--necessarily include some greater "amount and
substantiality" of the copyrighted original than might be the case for some other
kind of a use or in some other area of creativity. Instead, added weight must go to
17 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
18 § 107(3).
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factor one-the purpose and character of such a use.19
Thus approached, a use that is truly aimed at encouraging a broader and/or
more discriminating appreciation of a work of visual art should, absent some
fatal problem under factor four, per se qualify as a fair use. Factor three, then,
might regain some greater weight only when the purpose of the use did not
pertain to education, criticism, or comment
II.
The extent to which strong copyright protection is warranted for a work of
visual art may depend upon the business model by which it is distributed to the
public and the medium in which it was originally created. Works of visual art are
distributed to the public through a broader variety of business models than are the
products of other creative domains. Consider the spectrum along which these
might be arrayed.
At one extreme is the model employed by Thomas Kinkade, the California
painter of sentimental landscapes and rain-glittering city scenes whom The New
York Times recently described as this country's most commercially successful
artist.20 Kinkade reportedly does not sell his original paintings at all. What he
sells instead are prints made from these. Distributed by a captive network of
more than two hundred galleries (the "Signature Galleries"), these prints are
offered in a dazzling variety of formats: Studio Proofs, Gallery Proofs,
Renaissance Editions, versions touched up with a little paint by a studio assistant
and versions touched up with quite a bit more paint by the artist himself. Prices
can range from thirty-five dollars for a small framed gift card to ten thousand
dollars or more for a large hand-touched paper print mounted on canvas. While
some editions are limited in size, those limits can run up to several thousand for
each size of each image. For fiscal 1999, Kinkade's publisher-the New York
Stock Exchange listed Media Arts Group, Tnc.-reported net revenues of one
hundred twenty-six million dollars. Assuming that half the retail sales proceeds
were retained by the galleries, that would suggest that the volume of Kinkade
sales to the public is now in the vicinity of two hundred and fifty million dollars
annually.
At the Kinkade end of the spectrum, then, what we have is the work of art as
the source of a valuable image. At the other end of the spectrum, though-in
total contrast-is the work of art as a precious object The most familiar example
of a work of art of this latter type is the hand-painted canvas that an artist has
19 § 107(1).
20 Tessa DeCarlo, Landscapes by the Carload: Art or Kitsch?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999,
at 51 (describing Kinkade's working methods, marketing strategy, philosophy and audience).
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personally created in a single copy-a copy that he or she hopes to sell for a
price that will generally constitute the entire income ever to be realized from its
production. As a specific example, consider a work by the contemporary British
figurative painter Lucian Freud who has reportedly sold several of his most
recent paintings for prices that were upwards of two million dollars each.
Let us now suppose, first, that each of these artists still retains copyright to
his work and, second, that an art museum-the Philadelphia Museum of Art, for
example-without the authorization of either artist, produces and offers for sale
in its on-site museum shop, a set of full-color postcards of paintings by both these
artists, Kinkade and Freud. Assuming that the museum can successfully argue
that its distribution and sale of postcards is at bottom educational, thereby
meeting the threshold test of section 107; and assuming that the third section 107
fair use factor is not to be given any weight; how confidently can we proceed to
apply the fourth fair use factor-the one that addresses the effect of this use on
the market?
In the case of Kinkade, the fourth factor makes an excellent fit. Kinkade's
business model is essentially that of a book publisher who, without ever
attempting to sell the underlying manuscript itself, simultaneously offers deluxe,
clothbound and paperbound editions of the text. Under those circumstances, the
unauthorized Kinkade postcard might compete directly with the small-framed
gift cards that Kinkade's galleries themselves offer for thirty-five dollars. An
attempt to defend such a use as fair under section 107 might very well founder
over this fourth factor, potentially having an effect on the market for or value of
the copyrighted work. To permit the manufacture and distribution of such
postcards could only, in Judge Leval's analysis, diminish the artist's incentives
for creativity without providing the public with any substantial benefit beyond
that which it already enjoys.
The case of the Freudian postcards is different. Freud's business model-a
very traditional model for painters-is to sell his original paintings and to
suppress whatever urge he may otherwise feel to traffic in printed copies of
these. The fourth factor of section 107 scarcely fits his situation at all. Assuming
in the first place that the paintings depicted on the postcards were for sale-they
might not be; they might be in the hands of museums that never dispose of works
of art from their collections-it would still be ludicrous to contend that these
postcards might adversely affect the artist's market because a potential purchaser
of one of his paintings would not likely be tempted to acquire a postcard as a
substitute.
Alternately, although such an unauthorized postcard might be competitive
with an authorized small-scale printed version of the painting-in which case its
manufacture and distribution might be palpably unfair-what if no such
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authorized small-scale version is to be anticipated? The 2 LIVE CREW case,21
discussed earlier, suggests that an unauthorized derivative work may constitute a
fair use when there is little likelihood of a similar version ever appearing with the
copyright owner's authorization. If these postcards and other small-scale printed
versions are unauthorized derivative works, then it might be arguable, again in
Levallian terms, that the museum's production and distribution of these Freudian
postcards is enriching to the public without diminishing the artist's incentive for
continued creativity in any substantial way.22
Between these Kinkadian and Freudian extremes are a host of other business
models, each with its own following among visual artists. In every instance, to
what extent and how the section 107 factors can be applied to even so seemingly
simple a copy as a picture postcard will depend on very specific facts and
circumstances. And picture postcards, in turn, are only the tip of the complexity.
Offered within every museum shop, beyond those postcards, are a host of other
art-derived products, some of such hefty and indisputable educational value as
scholarly catalogues and some of such tangential or even dubious educational
value as coffee cups and tee-shirts. Notwithstanding the fantasies of those who
hope that copyright law might be smoothed out to an easy, uniform application,
each of these many uses might still require a separate determination, on the basis
of all of its particular facts and circumstances, to determine whether or not it was
a fair one.
Further complicating the application of the fourth fair use factor in section
107 is that the range of materials and techniques employed to create both original
works of visual art and copies of those works is also far broader than that to be
found in other creative domains. Notwithstanding the variety of forms they may
take, literary works are invariably embodied in language. Determining whether,
and to what degree, any particular text may be a copy of some other-even when
the language of the original has been changed through translation-may be little
more, at least conceptually, than a case of comparing apples with apples. Within
the visual arts, however, comparisons can rapidly escalate to the level of apples
and oranges.
Until late in the nineteenth century, the visual fine arts largely consisted of
painting in a variety of media and on a variety of surfaces, sculpture (both cast
metal and carved wood or stone), printmaking, and drawing. In the years since,
however, that list has expanded to include collage, constructed sculpture,
sculpture cast or otherwise fabricated in glass, plastic and ceramic, conceptual
21 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
2 2 In other words, it is arguable that such a use might tend to be of benefit to the public
without unduly discouraging the artist from further production. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text (discussing the two-pronged test proposed by Judge Leval).
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art, fabric art, earth art, and, perhaps most importantly, the whole and still-
expanding range of photography-based fine art forms including still photography,
motion pictures, video art, and, now just emerging, Internet art. Also expanded
has been the range of materials and techniques by which these original works of
fine art may be copied, sometimes in their original media, sometimes in other
media altogether.
Returning to our hypothetical on-site museum store-the one that specializes
in unauthorized copies-the least perplexing cases for fair use purposes might be
those in which an original work of art was copied so exactly in terms both of its
medium and its appearance as to be virtually indistinguishable from the original.
That might, for example, be the case with a minimalist sculpture by Donald Judd
or Carl Andre, a black and white photograph by Robert Mapplethorpe or a work
of digitalized video art by Bruce Nauman. In those instances, the fourth fair use
factor of section 107 again appears to make an easy fit. Setting aside their lack of
appeal to that perhaps handful of collectors with the means to pay a premium
price for a real Judd, Andre, Mapplethorpe, or Nauman original, the production
and distribution of these copies might readily be enjoined on competitive
grounds, i.e., that-to use another Levallian term-they are wholly duplicative
rather than in any sense transformative 3 Here the balance tips toward
protection. For the public, no gain. For the artists, some pain.
Not so obvious, however, might be the outcome when the copy is in a
different medium: a small black and white photograph of a monumental and
brilliantly colored kinetic sculpture, for instance; or a videotape of the works
hung in a painting exhibition. Consider the case of the sculpture. Even if the
assertion that the photograph of the sculpture was fundamentally educational in
purpose failed to eliminate the third fair use factor from consideration, it would
by no means be clear how the "amount and substantiality" of the portion used in
the photograph would weigh in relation to the monumental sculpture as a whole.
As for the fourth fair use factor, its application to the museum-made photograph
might, in turn, depend on whether the sculptor herself was seeking to exploit a
market in such a derivative. At a policy level, this photographic copy-more
transformative, less duplicative-might be understood as providing the public
with a benefit beyond that furnished by the original without unduly penalizing
the copyright owner in the course of doing so. Thus understood, such a use
might, on balance, qualify as a fair one.
Again, as was the case with the different business models, generalities may
be misleading. The determination of whether any particular unauthorized copy
does or does not qualify as a fair use requires a careful examination of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding both the original and that copy.
23 See supra note 3 (discussing Leval's concept of "transformative").
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IV.
Particularly applicable to works of visual art is Susan Sontag's dictum that
"art is not only about something; it is something."24 It is here that the situation of
the visual arts diverges most radically from that of the literary ones. With the
possible exception of lyric poetry, literary works are primarily about something.
This is not so for works of visual art. They are about, but they also are.
That distinction has not always been recognized. In the second of his
Bridgeman Art Library opinions,25 for example, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan*
observed that photographic "transparencies stand in the same relation to the
original works of art as a photocopy stands to a page of typescript."26
Notwithstanding whatever accuracy that analogy might have had in the
particularly narrow context in which he invoked it-the question before Judge
Kaplan concerned the degree of originality involved in making photographs of
paintings-beyond that context the analogy he offered is wholly misleading. A
transparency or other photograph of a work of art most emphatically does not
bear the same relation to such work as does a photocopy to a page of typescript.
The photocopy is literally a reproduction. It includes virtually everything of
importance about the typescript except perhaps the watermark, weight, weave,
and finish of the paper on which it was originally typed. In terms of the
information it conveys about the text, however, it can readily be considered
complete.
By contrast, the transparency of the painting is anything but complete. A
confection of celluloid and colored dyes, it may capture the painting's
informational content-in essence, what it's about-but in no way does it reflect
what the painting is: that it is a tangible object with a physical scale and presence,
a canvas support or other surface encrusted and/or stained with a distinctively
applied coat of paint in a range of pigment-based colors that in the depth of their
hues and their subtle interplay far exceed anything that a camera might possibly
record. That the various paper products commonly generated from such
transparencies--catalogue and book illustrations, postcards, posters, and various
size prints suitable for framing-are so frequently referred to as "reproductions"
seems an unfortunately imprecise and misleading usage. If Judge Kaplan's
photocopy is truly what counts as a reproduction of the typescript from which it
2 4 Susan Sontag, On Style, in AGAINST INTERPRETATION 39 (1969).
2 5 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
26 Id at 198. The principal question in Bridgeman was whether meticulously prepared
color transparencies of two-dimensional works of art that were themselves in the public domain
contained a sufficient degree of originality to entitle such transparencies to independent
copyright protection. Id The Court held that they did not. Id.
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was made, then the only thing that ought comparably to count as a reproduction
of a six-foot-square heavily impastoed abstract expressionist canvas would be
another six-foot-square canvas-a full-scale and just as heavily impastoed copy
of the original. The transparency and its progeny are not reproductions. A more
accurate term for them might be "photoreductions."
Here again, the third of section 107's fair use factors comes into play. The
degree to which these photoreductions omit substantial parts of what a painting
"is" may arguably have implications in applying this third factor. In dealing with
such a photoreduction, what is the "portion used" that is to be compared in
"amount and substantiality" with the copyrighted work as a whole? For example,
in the case of one of our Freudian postcards, might we not appropriately think of
such a postcard as little more than a thin, pale reflection of the larger and more
imposing original? Might we not even analogize such a postcard to the quotation
of a brief passage excerpted from a longer text?
Such an interpretation would, of course, provide a further degree of fair use
protection to many of the photoreduction-based images in which museum shops
traditionally deal. As a possible improvement on Judge Kaplan's photocopier
analogy, consider this: a photograph has the same relation to an original painting
as the literal translation of a palindrome might have to the palindrome itself.
"'Madame, je suis Adam" may certainly catch the literal sense of "Madam, I'm
Adam." With equal certainty, though, what it has lost in translation is everything
that made the original a palindrome, and also that which made it interesting in the
first place.
V.
Fair use has so integral a connection to the maintenance of a robust visual
creativity in our society that we can ill afford even to limit its application no less
to lose it completely. Of the several threats it faces, two seem particularly
noteworthy. The first threat is any effort to simplify its application-to formulate
a one-size-fits-all rule that might be incorporated into software and provide
prompt, clear, and reliable answers as to which proposed uses were and were not
fair ones. For better or worse, fair use in the visual realm--with its extreme
reliance on particular facts and circumstances--may never be a neat or tidy
affair. The other threat, perhaps equally dangerous, might be the restriction of
access to copyrighted materials in cyberspace. That could be particularly
damaging in the case of artists.
Fair use is quintessentially a "don't ask" practice. First comes the use; and
the discussion of whether or not it was a fair use follows, if and when the original
copyright owner objects. A use authorized in advance is only an authorized use,
not a fair one. When the authors of the 1995 White Paper speculated in an
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ominous footnote that fair use might be an "anachronism with no role to play" in
the age of electronic commerce, what they presumably meant was that fair use
was a potential stumbling block.27 Fair use is far too fact-specific to make an
easy fit with a seamlessly functioning, self-regulating, and encryption-guarded
system in which all of the aspects of a copyright negotiation-the scope and
terms of a proposed use, the fee to be paid, and perhaps even the payment
itself-might be wholly integrated into one smooth process.
Whatever the advantages of such a system in commercial convenience, the
potential threat to creative freedom could be considerable. If visual artists are to
enrich our society by "molding and remolding" the environment in which we
live, they require unfettered access to all of the aspects of that environment-
including however much thereof may happen to consist of materials copyrighted
by others-so that they can do their work and so that we may have its ultimate
benefit. In its way, fair use is the "Robin Hood" provision of copyright. Within
limits, it permits the artist-not infrequently envisioned as a sort of rogue-to
poach on the content-rich so long as excessive harm is not done and so long as
something with a value beyond that of the original is thereby made available to
everybody else. Even now as the lush and enchanted forest of cyberspace springs
up all about us, room-some place for play, some proper clearing in the woods-
still needs to be left for Robin Hood.
27 US. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 73 n. 227 (1995) (the
"White Paper").
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